Abstract: Are people selfish or altruistic? Throughout history this question has been answered on the basis of much introspection and little evidence. It has been at the heart of many controversial debates in politics, science, and philosophy. Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centered around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is key for understanding the evolutionary dynamics as well as the proximate patterns of human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism pointing towards the need for theories of cultural evolution and gene-culture coevolution.
Introduction
Human societies represent a huge anomaly in the animal world. They are based on a detailed division of labour and cooperation of genetically unrelated individuals in large groups (Boyd/Richerson 2005) . This is obviously true for modern societies with their large organizations and nation states, but it also holds for hunter-gatherers which typically have dense networks of exchange relations and practice sophisticated forms of food-sharing, cooperative hunting, and collective warfare (Hill 2002; Kaplan et al. 2000) . In contrast, most animal species exhibit little division of labour and cooperation is limited to small groups. Even in other primate societies, with whom we share common ancestors, cooperation is orders of magnitude less developed than it is among humans. Exceptions are social insects such as ants and bees, or the naked mole rat; however, their cooperation is based on a substantial amount of genetic relatedness.
Why are humans such spectacular outliers with respect to all other animals? We propose that uniquely human forms of altruism provide the answer to this question. Human altruism goes far beyond that which has been observed in the animal world. Among animals, costly and fitness reducing acts which confer fitness benefits to other individuals are largely restricted to kin groups; despite several decades of research, evidence for reciprocal altruism in pair-wise repeated encounters (Axelrod/Hamilton 1981; Nowak/Sigmund 1993; Trivers 1971) remains scarce (Hammerstein 2003) . Likewise, there is little evidence that cooperation in non-human animals is affected by individual reputation building. This contrasts strongly with what we find in humans. If we randomly pick two human strangers from a modern society and give them the chance to engage in repeated anonymous exchanges in a laboratory experiment, reciprocally altruistic behaviour emerges spontaneously with a high probability (Andreoni /Miller 1993; Gächter/Falk 2002) . However, human altruism even extends far beyond reciprocal altruism and reputation-based cooperation taking the form of strong reciprocity Gintis 2000) . Strong reciprocity is a combination of altruistic rewarding-a readiness to reward others in response to fair outcomes or behaviour-and altruistic punishment-a willingness to sanction others for norm violations. Strong reciprocators bear the cost of rewarding or punishing but gain no individual economic benefits whatsoever from their acts. In contrast, reciprocal altruists, as they have been defined in the biological literature (Axelrod/Hamilton 1981; Trivers 1971) , reward and punish only if this is in their long-term self-interest. Strong reciprocity thus constitutes a powerful incentive for cooperation even in non-repeated interactions and when reputation gains are absent because those who cooperate will be rewarded while those who defect will be punished by strong reciprocators.
The first part of this review is devoted to the experimental evidence documenting the relative importance of repeated encounters, reputation formation, and strong reciprocity for human cooperation. We do not discuss the role of kinship in human altruism because it is well known that humans share kin-driven altruism with many other animals (Daly/Wilson 1988). We will show that the interaction between selfish and strongly reciprocal individuals is decisive for the understanding of human cooperation. We identify conditions under which selfish individuals trigger the breakdown of cooperation, and conditions under which the strongly reciprocal individuals have the power to ensure wide-spread cooperation. Next we discuss the limits of human altruism limits arising from the costs of altruistic acts, from competition among individuals, and from group boundaries. Then we show how recently developed mathematical theories of human motivation provide powerful tools for understanding and predicting proximate patterns of altruistic behaviours. Finally, we discuss the evolutionary origins of the different forms of human altruism. We are particularly interested in whether strong reciprocity represents an adaptive trait that can be explained by recent evolutionary models, whether these models can explain why humans, but not other animals, exhibit large-scale cooperation among genetically unrelated indi-viduals, and to what extent the evidence supports the key ingredients of these models.
Proximate Patterns
Suppose you observe that a friend of yours incurs cost to help another person. Why does your friend do this? He might be concerned about his reputation with respect to you because you observe him. Alternatively, he might be concerned about his reputation visà vis the person he assisted and expect that this person will help him in future encounters. A third possibility is that your friend is truly a nice person who even helps if no reputation is at stake and future encounters are highly unlikely. Although you may have an opinion about why your friend helped you can never be sure. Observations of behaviour in real life circumstances will almost never enable you to discriminate between the different motives for helping. This is the reason why sound knowledge about the motives behind altruistic acts predominantly comes from laboratory experiments. In the laboratory, the researcher controls the anonymity conditions and the possibilities for future interactions and reputation formation, which enables him to discriminate between different motives for helping or punishing. Therefore, we first discuss experiments in which interactions among kin, repeated encounters, and reputation formation have been ruled out. In a sense, altruistic acts occurring in this environment are 'truly' altruistic because no future economic benefits for the individual or the individual's genes are possible. Next, we document how the possibility of future encounters and individual reputation formation changes subjects' behaviour. In all experiments discussed below, real money, sometimes up to three months' income (Cameron 1999; Fehr et al. 2002; Hoffman et al. 1996; Slonim/Roth 1998) , was at stake. Subjects never knew the personal identities of those with whom they interacted and they had full knowledge about the structure of the experiment-the available sequence of actions and the prevailing information conditions. If, e.g., the experiment ruled out future encounters between the same individuals, subjects were fully informed about this. To rule out any kind of social pressure, the design of the experiment even ensured in several instances that the experimenter could not observe subjects' individual actions but only the statistical distribution of actions (Bolton et al. 1998; Bolton/Zwick 1995; Hoffman et al. 1994 ).
Altruistic Punishment
The ultimatum game (UG) (Güth et al. 1982) nicely illustrates that a sizeable number of people from a wide variety of cultures (Henrich et al. 2001; Roth et al. 1991) facing high monetary stakes (Cameron 1999; Hoffman et al. 1996; Slonim/Roth 1998) are willing to hurt others to prevent unfair outcomes or to punish unfair behaviour. In the UG, two subjects have to agree on the division of a fixed sum of money. Person A, the proposer, can make exactly one proposal of how to divide the money. Then person B, the responder, can accept or reject the proposed division. In case of rejection, both receive nothing whereas in case of acceptance, the proposal is implemented. A robust result in this experiment is that proposals that give the responder shares below 25 percent of the available money are rejected with a very high probability. This shows that responders do not behave in a self-interest maximizing manner because a selfish responder would accept any positive share. In general, the motive indicated for the rejection of positive, yet 'low', offers is that responders view them as unfair. Most proposers seem to understand that low offers will be rejected. Therefore, the equal split is often the modal offer in the UG (Güth et al. 1990 ). The decisive role of rejections in the UG is indicated by the dictator game in which the proposer unilaterally dictates the division of the money because the responder cannot reject the offer. In the dictator game, the modal amount given to the responders is often zero (Forsythe et al. 1994; Hoffman et al. 1994) .
To what extent do rejections in the UG confer benefits on other people? The altruistic dimension of rejections emerges when there is a population of proposers and responders, who repeatedly play the UG in such a way that no pair of players meets again and no player knows anything about the previous history of his opponent. If the proposers believe that there are many altruistic punishers among the responders, they have a reason for making high offers, which benefit all responders. Thus, rejections are individually costly acts, which contribute to the collective reputation of the responders for being tough bargainers. They are altruistic acts because every responder, i.e., also one who does not reject, benefits from the higher offers that are generated by the collective reputation. For the purpose of this review, we ran an experiment with 10 proposers who met a different responder in 10 successive rounds. We observed that proposers who experienced a rejection in the previous round increased their offers in the current round by 6.5 percent.
In the UG, the responder is directly affected by the action of the proposer. However, a key element of the enforcement of many social norms, such as foodsharing norms in hunter-gatherer societies (Hill 2002; Kaplan et al. 2000) , is that people punish norm violators not for what they did to themselves but for what they did to others (Bendor/Swistak 2001; Sober/Wilson 1998) . Norm enforcement involves the punishment of norm violations even by those who are not economically affected by the violation. To study this question experimentally, we conducted a third-party punishment game (Fehr/Fischbacher 2004) . In the third-party punishment game (TPG) there are three subjects. Subject A is endowed with 100 money units (MUs), subject B has nothing and subject C is endowed with 50 MUs. A is in the role of a dictator, i.e. he is free to give whatever he wants to the 'poor' subject B who is just a passive recipient of A's transfer. After the third party C has been informed about A's transfer to B he can spend money to punish A. Every MU spent on punishment reduces A's income by three MUs. The TPG is played exactly once and, due to anonymity, nobody can gain any reputation. Therefore, no selfish third party will ever spend money on punishment. Yet, we hypothesized that a fairness norm applies to this situation and, therefore, altruistic punishers were expected to punish A for sending unfairly low transfers to B. In fact, 55 percent of the third parties (n = 22) punish player A for transfers below 50 and punishment increases the lower the Figure 1 : Altruistic punishment by third parties who are not directly affected by the violation of a fairness norm. The fair transfer level is given by 50. The more the dictator's transfer falls short of the fair level of 50, the more third parties punish the dictator. The recipients of the transfer also expect that the dictators will be punished for unfair transfers. Data are taken from (Fehr/Fischbacher 2004) transfer (Figure 1) . Moreover, between 70 and 80 percent of the recipients (n = 22) expect that dictators will be punished for transfers below 50. The recipients also expect that lower transfers will be punished more strongly, indicating that lower transfers are interpreted as more severe norm violations. Punishment by third parties creates an obvious benefit for the recipient because it deters dictators from keeping all the money. Recent research shows that altruistic punishment by third parties also applies to prisoner dilemmas (Fehr/Fischbacher 2004) : Third parties frequently punish a defector if the opponent of the defector cooperated. A further interesting regularity is the fact that, although third party punishment is quite frequent, it is less prevalent and less severe than altruistic punishment by parties affected directly.
Altruistic Rewarding
Sequentially played social dilemmas are a powerful tool for the study of altruistic rewarding. They come in various forms-as gift exchange games (Fehr et al. 1993) , trust games (Berg et al. 1995) , or sequentially played prisoners' dilemmas (Hayashi et al. 1999 )-but the basic structure is captured by the following example. Two subjects, A and B, are endowed with, say, 10 MUs. Both subjects can keep whatever they like but they can also transfer part or all of their endowment to their opponent. The experimenter doubles any amount sent to the other subject so that, collectively, the two subjects are best off if they transfer their whole endowment: If both keep what they have, each subject earns 10 MUs, if both transfer their whole endowment each earns 20 MUs. From a selfish viewpoint, however, it is best to keep one's own endowment and to hope that the other subject transfers the whole endowment, yielding 30 MUs for oneself and 0 for the other. This experiment mimics the essence of a vast number of real life situations. Any kind of mutually beneficial exchange that takes place in the absence of enforceable contracts is characterized by a similar structure. In these situations, both players are better off exchanging their goods and favours but there is also a strong temptation to cheat.
To study altruistic rewarding in the experiment above, one subject, say A, first makes a transfer. Then B is informed about A's transfer and decides how much to send to A. It is obvious that a selfish player B will send back nothing regardless how much he received. In fact, however, more than 50 percent of subjects in the role of B transfer money and frequently B's transfer increases A's transfer (Berg et al. 1995; Fehr et al. 1993) . This becomes particularly transparent in the sequential prisoners' dilemma in which both subjects have only two available actions-to send nothing or to send everything. Here, if subject A sends nothing, virtually all B's respond with a transfer of zero while if A sends everything a sizeable percentage of B's-often more than 50 percent, sometimes approaching 90 percent-also send everything (Hayashi et al. 1999) . Like altruistic punishment, the presence of altruistic rewarding has also been documented in many different countries (Buchan et al. 2002) , in populations with varying demographic characteristics (Bellemare/Kröger 2003) , and under stake levels approaching 2-3 months' income .
Strong Reciprocity and Multilateral Cooperation
A decisive feature of human cooperation in hunter-gatherer societies is that it is not restricted to bilateral interactions but also takes place in relatively large groups of dozens or several hundred individuals. To what extent does strong reciprocity contribute to cooperation in public goods situations involving larger groups of individuals? By definition, a public good can be consumed by every group member regardless of the member's contribution to the good. Therefore, each member has an incentive to free-ride on the contributions of others. This incentive can be neatly captured by the following one-shot experiment. Suppose each of n > 2 subjects is endowed with 10 MUs which can be privately kept or spent on a group project. Subjects decide simultaneously on how much they keep and how much they contribute. The experimenter doubles the total amount spent on the group project and distributes the proceeds of the doubled amount equally among the n members. This means that for every MU spent on the project each group member, including the contributing subject, earns 2/n MUs which is less than 1 because of n > 2. Yet, the contributing subject has costs of 1, meaning that a selfish subject never contributes anything to the project in a one-shot experiment. This holds, although it would be collectively rational to contribute everything because if all participants keep their endowments, they earn 10 MUs each, whereas if all contribute their endowments they earn 20 MUs a piece.
In such public goods experiments, altruistic rewarding implies that an individual's contributions increase due to the expected contributions from the other subjects. Subjects reward others if others are expected to raise their cooperation. If the experiment is played only once, subjects typically contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment. There is also strong evidence that higher expectations about others' contributions induce individual subjects to contribute more (Dawes 1980; Fischbacher et al. 2001; Messick/Brewer 1983; Yamagishi/Kiyonari 2000) . The interesting fact is, however, that cooperation is rarely stable and deteriorates to rather low levels if the game is played repeatedly (and anonymously) for 10 rounds (Andreoni 1988; Isaac et al. 1984; Ledyard 1995) . Early researchers inferred from this that if subjects gain experience with the situation, they learn to play what is in their best selfish interests. This interpretation has turned out to be untrue because if the same subjects are given the chance to start a new 10 round game, they start again with high cooperation rates (Andreoni 1988) .
The most plausible interpretation of the decay of cooperation is based on the fact that subjects are heterogeneous in their degree of strong reciprocity. A recent study (Fischbacher et al. 2001) indicated that 10 percent of the subjects are willing to fully match the expected average contribution of other group members, 40 percent give somewhat less than the expected average contribution of others, 30 percent are complete free-riders who never contribute anything, 14 percent roughly match others' contribution until they spent half of their endowment, and the rest of the subjects exhibit quite irregular behaviour. Thus, on average, individual subjects increase their contribution levels in response to Figure 2 : The decay of cooperation over time. Subjects are heterogenous with regard to their willingness to reward altruistically. This results in the relationship between the expected average contribution of other group members to the public good and the contribution of a representative individual (the average conditional cooperation) shown in the figure. Initially, individuals expect high average contribution rates, say 80 percent of the endowment. On average, this induces them to contribute 50 percent. Therefore, expectations are disappointed which leads to a downwards revision of expectations to say, 50 percent of the endowment. Yet, if individuals expect 50 percent they will in fact only contribute roughly 30 percent causing a further downwards revision of expectations. The process stops at the intersection point with the 45-degree line, which determines the equilibrium level of altruistic cooperation in this setting.
expected increases in the average contribution of other group members, but the intercept and the steepness of this relationship is insufficient to establish an equilibrium with high cooperation (Figure 2) . In round 1, subjects typically have optimistic expectations about others' cooperation but, given the aggregate pattern of behaviours, this expectation will necessarily be disappointed, leading to a breakdown of cooperation over time.
This breakdown of cooperation provides an important lesson. Despite the fact that there are a large number of strong reciprocators, they cannot prevent the decay of cooperation under these circumstances. In fact, it can be shown theoretically that in a population with a clear majority of strong reciprocators, a small minority of selfish individuals suffices to render zero cooperation the unique equilibrium (Fehr/Schmidt 1999) . This implies that it is not possible to infer the absence of altruistic individuals from a situation in which we observe little cooperation. If strong reciprocators believe that no one else will cooperate, they also will not cooperate. To maintain cooperation in n-person interactions, the upholding of the belief that all or most members of the group will cooperate is thus decisive.
Any mechanism that generates such a belief has to provide cooperation incentives for the selfish and insufficiently reciprocal individuals. Direct punishment of non-cooperators in repeated interactions (Ostrom et al. 1992; Yamagishi 1986) or altruistic punishment in one-shot interactions (Fehr/Gächter 2002) provides one possibility. If cooperators have the chance to target their punishment directly towards those who defect and if the cost of sanctioning is lower than the cost of being sanctioned, punishment opportunities cause a large increase in cooperation levels and prevent a breakdown of cooperation (Fehr/Gächter 2002; Ostrom et al. 1992; Yamagishi 1986 ). The reason is that cooperators impose strong sanctions on the defectors, providing the necessary incentives for cooperation. Thus, in the presence of targeted punishment opportunities, strong reciprocators are capable of enforcing wide-spread cooperation by deterring potential non-cooperators. In fact, it can be shown theoretically that even a minority of strong reciprocators suffices to discipline a majority of selfish individuals when direct punishment is possible (Fehr/Schmidt 1999 ).
Repeated Interactions and Reputation Formation
A reputation for behaving altruistically is another powerful mechanism for the enforcement of cooperation in n-person public goods situations. If people are engaged in bilateral encounters as well as in n-person public goods interactions, a defection in the public goods situation, if known by others, may decrease others' willingness to help in bilateral interactions. This idea has been neatly captured by the following experiment (Milinski et al. 2002b) . Suppose that after each round of interaction in the public goods experiment, subjects play a so-called indirect reciprocity game (Nowak/Sigmund 1998a; b) . In this game subjects are matched in pairs and one subject is randomly placed in the role of a 'donor' and the other in the role of a 'recipient'. The donor can help the recipient by giving an amount of money, say 2 MUs, which is doubled by the experimenter so that the recipient gets 4 MUs. The recipient's reputation is given by his decision in the previous public goods round and his history of helping decisions in the indirect reciprocity game. It turns out that the recipients' reputation in the public goods game is an important determinant for the donors' decisions. They punish the recipients by significantly reducing the likelihood of help when the recipients defected in the previous public goods game. This, in turn, has a powerful cooperation enhancing effect.
Helping behaviour in indirect reciprocity experiments has also been documented in the absence of interactions in public goods games (Milinski et al. 2001; Wedekind/Milinski 2000) . A crucial element in these experiments is that direct reciprocity is ruled out because no recipient will ever be put in a position where he can give to one of his previous donors. Helping rates between 50 and 90 percent can be achieved in these experiments, and recipients with a history of generous helping decisions are significantly more likely to receive help themselves. This suggests that the donors' behaviour may be driven by the desire to acquire a good reputation. However, it is also possible that altruistic rewarding drives helping behaviour. A neat way to study the relative importance of altruistic rewarding and reputation seeking in indirect reciprocity experiments is to allow only half the subjects in an experiment to acquire a reputation (Engelmann/Fischbacher 2002) . This means that one can compare the behaviour of donors who cannot gain a reputation with the behaviour of those who can. The data show that both altruistic rewarding and reputation seeking are powerful determinants of donors' behaviour. Donors without a reputation help in 37 percent of the cases whereas those with a reputation help in 74 percent of the cases. Moreover, donors with a reputation are much more likely to also help recipients with only a moderately generous history of helping whereas donors without a reputation target their help towards those recipients who have a high reputation for being generous.
These and other results (Milinski et al. 2002a ; Seinen/Schram in press) suggest that humans are very attentive to possibilities of individual reputation formation. They exhibit a sizeable baseline level of altruistic rewarding, and when given the opportunity to gain a reputation for being generous, helping rates strongly increase. Humans are similarly attentive to the possibility of repeated interactions with the same individual (reciprocal altruism). In sequential social dilemmas, the cooperation rate of the second movers is much higher if they know that there is a possibility of meeting the same partners again in future periods (Gächter/Falk 2002) . Likewise, in simultaneously played prisoners' dilemmas, subjects are keenly attuned to the possibility of future interactions (Andreoni /Miller 1993; DalBo 2003) . Cooperation rates strongly increase when the probability of future interactions with the same partner increases from zero to In the domain of rewarding behaviours, there is thus much evidence indicating that subjects understand the difference between one-shot and repeated encounters well, and also between interactions in which their reputation is or is not at stake. In the domain of punishing behaviours, however, little is known about repetition and reputation effects. For this purpose we conducted a com-puterized (Fischbacher 1998 ) series of 10 ultimatum games in two conditions-a reputation condition and a baseline condition. In both conditions, there were 10 proposers and 10 responders and no proposer met the same responder more than once. In every period, the proposer suggests how to allocate 10 MUs between himself and the responder, who could accept or reject this proposal. In the reputation condition, the proposers were informed about the current responder's past rejection behaviour whereas in the baseline condition this knowledge was absent. This means that in the reputation condition, the responders could gain an individual reputation for being tough bargainers by rejecting high offers. A responder who incurred the short-term cost of a rejection could gain the longterm benefits of a 'good' reputation by inducing future proposers to make him better offers. Since this economic benefit was absent in the baseline condition, subjects who understand the logic of reputation formation will exhibit higher acceptance standards in the reputation condition.
In both conditions, the responders indicated in each period an acceptance threshold before they knew the current offer. If the actual offer turned out to be above the threshold it was accepted, if it turned out to be below the threshold it was rejected. All subjects participated in a sequence of both conditions. The results show that when the subjects were first in the baseline condition, the average acceptance threshold was about 3 MUs whereas if they entered the reputation condition, their thresholds immediately jumped to more than 4 MUs ( Figure  3a ). This jump in the thresholds forced the proposers to increase their offers. Similarly, if the reputation condition took place first, the average thresholds immediately decreased when subjects entered the baseline condition ( Figure 3a) . Moreover, this change in the average thresholds is not an artefact of aggregation. It is explained by the fact that the vast majority of responders (82 percent, n = 94) increases the threshold in the reputation condition relative to the baseline (Figure 3b ) while the remaining minority keeps the thresholds roughly constant. These results suggest that altruistic punishers clearly understand that, if individual reputation building is possible, it pays to acquire a reputation as a tough bargainer. This also means that their rejections in the baseline condition cannot be attributed to cognitive problems in understanding when individual reputation matters and when it does not matter.
Limits of Human Altruism
Strongly reciprocal individuals reward and punish in anonymous one-shot interactions. Yet, they reward and punish more in repeated interactions or when their reputation is at stake. This suggests that they are motivated by a combination of altruistic and selfish concerns. Their altruistic motives induce them to cooperate and punish in one-shot interactions and their selfish motives induce them to increase rewarding and punishing in repeated interactions or when reputation building is possible. If this argument is correct, we should also observe that altruistic acts are less frequent if their costs are increased. At a higher cost, individuals have to give up more of their own payoff to help others, so that for a given combination of selfish and altruistic motives, the individuals will exhibit (a) Figure 3a : Responders' acceptance thresholds in the ultimatum game with and without reputation. Time trend of acceptance thresholds. If the control treatment without the opportunity to build an individual reputation for toughness is conducted first, the responders reject offers below 3 money units (dark line with empty markers). Immediately after the implementation of reputation building opportunities in period 11, the acceptance thresholds jump up to more than 4 money units indicating the desire to be known as a 'tough' responder (dark line with filled markers). If the reputation treatment comes first (light line) the removal of the opportunity to acquire a reputation immediately causes a decrease in responders' acceptance thresholds. Data are taken from (Fehr/Fischbacher 2003) (b) Figure 3b : Individual level changes in responders' average acceptance thresholds. The relative size of the circles represents the frequency of observations behind a circle. Responders who increase their average acceptance threshold in the reputation condition relative to the baseline condition generate a data point above the 45-degree line. The vast majority of responders increase their thresholds when they can gain a reputation for toughness. Only a small minority lowers the thresholds or keeps them roughly constant. Data are taken from (Fehr/Fischbacher 2003) Figure 3: less altruistic behaviour. The evidence from dictator games and public good games confirms this prediction. If the own payoff that needs to be invested to produce one unit of the public good increases, subjects invest less into the public good (Isaac/Walke 1988; Ledyard 1995) . Likewise, if in the dictator game the cost of transferring one MU to the recipient increases, the dictators give less money to the recipients (Andreoni /Miller 2002) .
Interestingly, if the cost of altruistic rewarding and punishing increases for others, subjects also anticipate that this will reduce others' strongly reciprocal behaviour. This has been shown in a sequential social dilemma with three stages (Fehr et al. 1997 ): First subject A decided how much to cooperate. Then subject B chose the cooperation level and, finally, subject A had the option to reward or punish B after he observed B's cooperation level. In the low cost condition, every MU invested by A into rewarding or punishing B increased or decreased B's payoff by 2.5 MUs. In the high cost condition, A's cost of rewarding and punishing were increased by a factor of 5. In the low cost condition, subjects in the role of A rewarded high and punished low cooperation by subject B much more than in the high cost condition. Moreover, subjects in the role of B anticipated the decrease in rewarding and punishment in the high-cost condition and, hence, cooperated much less. This suggests that humans have a well developed capability of judging the determinants of other people's altruistic behaviour.
A particularly interesting form of cost change occurs if one introduces competition into the UG Roth et al. 1991) . Suppose that instead of one there are two responders who simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject a given offer by the proposer. If both responders reject, all three players receive a zero payoff. If both accept, each responder has a 50 percent chance of receiving the proposed amount. If only one responder accepts, the accepting responder receives the proposed amount, the proposer receives the rest and the rejecting responder has a zero payoff. The crucial element in this game is that if one of the responders is willing to accept an offer, the other responder can no longer punish the proposer by rejecting the offer. The impossibility of punishment is like an infinite cost of punishment for the responder. Therefore, one should expect that the responders reject the same offers much less in the competitive situation in comparison with the bilateral UG. Moreover, the reduction of the rejection rate should occur only in those cases in which a responder believes that the competitor accepts the offer. Both facts are fully born out by the data : In the competitive situation, the rejection rate is dramatically lower and the whole reduction can be explained by the responders' pessimistic beliefs about the competing responders' behaviour. The evidence also shows that the proposers take advantage of the lower rejection rate and propose much lower offers in the competitive situation. This suggests that the proposers anticipate the lower rejection rate by the responders.
Anecdotal and ethnographic evidence suggests that ethnicity and other group boundaries may exert a strong influence on human altruism. There is a large experimental literature suggesting that even members of 'minimal' groups give more favourable treatment to the other members of their group and less favourable treatment to out-group members (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel et al. 1971 ). Members of a minimal group share a trivial, purely nominal, social category, e.g. if subjects are allocated to groups according to whether they prefer Kandinski paintings over Klee paintings or vice versa. In a typical minimal group experiment, the members of a group make a series of decisions that determine the payoff between two other subjects-one of these subjects is an in-group member the other one an out-group member. For instance, subjects might have to decide between (5 for subject A, 2 for subject B) and (4 for A, 4 for B). The evidence from such experiments shows that a non-negligible fraction of subjects allocate higher payoffs to in-group members. While this evidence is not contested, the interpretation of the facts is highly controversial. The social identity interpretation (Tajfel 1982) assumes a universal human motivation for maintaining a positive self-identity. Because self-identity partly derives from social identity, i.e., from identity of the groups to which one belongs, subjects are assumed to be motivated to treat members of their own group in a positively distinct way.
This interpretation has, however, been convincingly challenged by experiments showing that in-group favouritism in minimal groups is reversed if ingroup members know that their own payoff is not determined by other in-group members' decisions but exclusively by the decisions of out-group members (Rabbie et al. 1989; Yamagishi et al. 1999) . If in-group subjects know that their payoff is determined by other in-group members, a significant number of the in-group subjects behave more altruistically towards other in-group members. If, instead, in-group subjects know that their payoff is determined by out-group members, a significant number of in-group members behaves more altruistically towards the out-group members.
It is important to stress that subjects in these minimal group experiments do not interact in pairs so that direct reciprocation with other in-or out-group members is completely ruled out. Nevertheless, subjects allocate more money to those groups whose members can affect their payoff, suggesting that they expect a kind of generalized reciprocation at the group level. Similar results have been confirmed by prisoners' dilemma games taking place within and across minimal groups (Yamagishi et al. 1999; Yamagishi/Kiyonari 2000) . Subjects typically expect more cooperation from in-group members, which induces them to cooperate more with in-group members. In fact, if one controls for subjects' expectations, the higher level of cooperation when paired with other in-group members vanishes. Thus, in-group favouritism in prisoners' dilemmas has nothing to do with social identity per se, but can be fully explained by the higher expected reciprocation from other in-group members.
Although subjects in minimal groups do not discriminate between in-and outgroup members, if one controls for their expectations of reciprocation, it seems plausible that the propensity for altruistic rewarding and punishment in naturally existing groups towards out-group members is lower. Until now, however, there has been no rigorous evidence supporting this conjecture. In a sequential social dilemma conducted in Israel, involving Ashkenazic Jews (European and American immigrants) and Eastern Jews (Asian and African immigrants), both Ashkenazic and Eastern Jews who were in the role of a first-mover cooperated less when they knew that the second-mover was an Eastern Jew (Fershtman/Gneezy 2001) . However, in a dictator game both groups gave the same amount to Ashkenazic and to Eastern Jews, indicating that the differential treatment in the social dilemma is driven by a lack of trust in Eastern Jews. Moreover, if one controls for first-mover cooperation, the Ashkenazic and Eastern second-movers exhibited the same cooperation in the social dilemma. Thus again, if one controls for subjects' expectations of reciprocation (or, in the case of second-movers, for first-mover behaviour) group boundaries have no effect on altruistic behaviour.
Proximate Theories
Altruistic rewarding and punishment imply that individuals have motives beyond their economic self-interest-their subjective evaluations of economic payoffs differ from the economic payoffs (Thibaut/Kelley 1959) . Take for example the PD. According to the economic payoffs, it is in the self-interest of each player to defect regardless of what the other player does (Figure 4a ). In fact, however, many subjects behave as if they prefer the mutual cooperation outcome over the outcome in which they defect and the other player cooperates. Thus, from the viewpoint of individuals with such preferences, the payoff matrix in Figure 4b captures the strategic situation much better. The game in Figure 4b is no longer a PD but a coordination game in which both mutual defection as well as mutual cooperation are in equilibrium. The crucial point is that a strong reciprocator is willing to cooperate if he believes that the opponent cooperates and, therefore, mutual cooperation is in equilibrium if two strong reciprocators are playing the PD. However, since mutual defection is also in equilibrium, it depends on the individuals' beliefs about the other players' actions as to whether the mutual cooperation or the mutual defection equilibrium is played.
Recent results on the neurobiology of cooperation in the PD support the view that individuals experience particular subjective rewards from mutual cooperation (Rillling et al. 2002) . If subjects achieve the mutual cooperation outcome with another human subject, the brain's reward circuit (components of the mesolimbic dopamine system including the striatum and the orbitofrontal cortex) is activated relative to a situation in which subjects achieve mutual cooperation with a programmed computer. Moreover, there is also evidence indicating a negative response of the dopamine system if a subject cooperates but the opponent defects. In another paper (Singer et al. 2004) it is shown that just seeing the faces of people who previously reciprocated cooperation in a sequential social dilemma game activates important parts of the brain's reward circuits. Moreover, not only mutual cooperation seems to involve non-pecuniary rewards but altruistic punishment also seems to be driven by activations in the human reward system. In a recent paper (de Quervain et al. 2004 ) it has been shown that the nucleus caudate is activated if subjects have the chance to punish free riders in a social dilemma game. The nucleus caudate is a key reward area that is typically activated when rewards are acquired through decisions or actions.
There is a extensive literature in social psychology and economics propos- The first number in each cell denotes the payoff of player 1, the second number is the payoff of player 2. Each player can cooperate (C) or defect (D). a. Economic payoffs in the prisoners' dilemma. For any given action of the other player, the economic payoff for each player is higher when he defects. b. Example of subjective payoffs in the prisoners' dilemma if both players are strong reciprocators. The subjective payoff from CC is 20 whereas the subjective evaluation of DC is only 15, inducing a strong reciprocator to cooperate if he believes that the opponent cooperates as well. If a player believes that the opponent defects for sure his subjective expected payoff from cooperation is -15 (indicating that a strong reciprocator dislikes being the sucker) whereas his subjective expected payoff from defection is 10 inducing the player to defect as well. Thus, both mutual cooperation (CC) and mutual defection (DD) is an equilibrium. c. Subjective payoffs in the prisoners' dilemma if inequity aversion is the motive behind strongly reciprocal behaviour. β > 0 measures how much a player dislikes advantageous inequity (guilt) whereas α > 0 measures how much a player dislikes disadvantageous inequity (envy). If 30 -30β is smaller than 20 a player prefers CC over DC rendering CC an equilibrium outcome. This holds if β exceeds 1/3. Since α > 0, an inequity averse player always prefers to defect if the other player defects rendering DD also an equilibrium outcome. Note that if both players exhibit α =β = 1 2 the subjective payoffs in part (c) are identical to those in part (b) of the figure. ing different social motives behind human altruism (Andreoni 1990; Frohlich/ Oppenheimer 1984; Loewenstein et al. 1989; MacCrimmon/Messick 1976; Margolis 1982; Messick/Sentis 1985; Thibaut/Kelley 1959) . One potential problem with these approaches is that ex-post, once the result of a particular experiment is observed, it is always easy to 'invent' a particular motive or set of motives to 'explain' the result. This criticism can be met if it is possible to explain subjects' behaviour in many different situations with a single additional motive or a very small set of additional motives. For example, is it possible to explain that the same individuals often both reward and punish other people. Which motives can explain both the low levels of cooperation in the public good game without punishment and the high cooperation levels in the game with a punishment opportunity? Is it possible to explain using the same motives that responders in the UG reject an offer of, say, 30% of the available money whereas when there is competition they accept offers of 10% or less? Why are responders in the UG tougher bargainers when there are reputation formation opportunities and why do subjects cooperate more in the repeated PD than in the one-shot PD? Fortunately, recent game theoretic models, which combine the existence of social motives with a rational choice approach, indicate that all these phenomena can be parsimoniously explained without inventing new motives for every situation (Bolton/Ockenfels 2000; Falk/Fischbacher, in press; Fehr/Schmidt 1999; Levine 1998 ).
Inequity Aversion
Theories of inequity aversion (Bolton/Ockenfels 2000; Fehr/Schmidt 1999; Loewenstein et al. 1989; Messick/Sentis 1985) assume that a non-negligible percentage of people are both motivated by their own economic payoff and dislike outcomes that are perceived as inequitable. The equitability of an outcome is determined by comparisons with reference groups and reference outcomes, which are themselves determined by complicated social comparison processes (Festinger 1954; Runciman 1966) . Recent theories of inequity aversion (Bolton/Ockenfels 2000; Fehr/Schmidt 1999) assume that if individuals are ahead of the reference outcome they are motivated to help others by transferring resources to those with lower economic payoffs. Yet, if they are behind the reference outcome they are motivated to lower the economic payoff of those ahead ( Figure 5 ). In laboratory experiments, though less often in real life situations, it is frequently plausible to assume that equality in economic payoffs is the relevant reference outcome. The reason is that experimental subjects enter the laboratory as equals, they don't know anything about each other, and they are allocated to the different roles in the experiment at random. It then seems natural to assume that the reference group is simply the set of subjects playing against each other and the reference outcome is given by the egalitarian outcome, so that inequity aversion boils down to inequality aversion ( Figure 5 and Box 1). Inequality averse individuals are willing to incur cost to narrow the difference in economic payoffs between themselves and their relevant reference agents.
Inequity aversion can be thought of as capturing the emotions of guilt and envy. If subjects are better off than the reference outcome they feel guilt, whereas if they are worse off they feel envy. Guilt motivates them to help those who are worse off while envy motivates them to hurt those who are better off. In this view, altruistic rewarding is driven by guilt while altruistic punishment is motivated by envy. Inequality aversion can be parsimoniously modelled by an envy parameter α and a guilt parameter β (Box 1). The larger α, the more an individual suffers from being behind; the larger β, the more the individual suffers from guilt if ahead. The assumption that there are individuals with inequality averse preferences, who rationally chose their actions to meet their goals, can explain why we observe cooperation in one-shot PD's, why responders reject low offers in the bilateral UG, why responders seem to care much less about low offers when competition prevails, and why cooperation often is rather low in the absence of punishment opportunities in public good experiments (Box 1).
Reciprocal Fairness
Although inequity aversion motives can explain a large and diverse set of facts, the concept has also its limits. One important limitation arises if the punishment cost for the punisher and the punished subject are the same. In this case, the punisher cannot change the payoff difference between himself and the punished person. Therefore, an inequity averse subject should never punish in this situation. There is, evidence, however, that between 20 and 30 percent of the subjects punish even if they cannot change the payoff difference (Falk et al., in press). A further limitation of inequity aversion can be illustrated by the following two conditions in a simplified UG (Brandts/Sola 2001; Falk et al. 2003) where 10 MUs have to be divided. In one condition the proposer can only propose either (5.5) or (8.2). In the other condition he can only propose either (10.0) or (8.2). An inequity averse responder will reject (8,2) regardless of whether (5.5) or (10.0) was the alternative to (8.2). However, an offer of (8.2) is likely to be interpreted by the responders as more unfair if (5.5) instead of (10.0) was the alternative. In fact (Falk et al., 2003) , the responders reject the (8.2) proposal with probability.09 if (10.0) is the alternative proposal, whereas if (5.5) is the alternative the (8.2) offer is rejected with probability.44. This suggests that the perceived fairness of an outcome depends not only on the outcome itself but also on the available set of alternative outcomes that could have been chosen by the proposer. A plausible way to interpret this is to say that the proposer's intentions are important for the responder's fairness judgement. If the proposer could have chosen the egalitarian distribution (5.5), the offer (8.2) signals greater unfair intentions than if the alternative was the (10.0) offer. Another interpretation is to say that a proposer who chooses (8.2), although (5.5) was available, reveals that he is a greedier person.
Figure 5: The subjective evaluation (utility) of an inequity averse player i as a function of the economic payoff of reference player j. The economic payoff of player i is fixed at x i , the economic payoff of player j, x j , varies along the horizontal axis and r ij denotes the reference outcome for player i relative to player j. If x i -r ij > x j an increase in x j increases i's subjective evaluation of the outcome, i.e., i is willing to transfer resources to j. If x i -r ij < x j an increase in x j decreases i's subjective evaluation of the outcome, i.e., i is willing to reduce the economic payoff of j. The utility of player i is highest if x i -r ij = x j . For r ij = 0 inequity aversion is identical to inequality aversion. The assumption of r ij = 0 often makes sense in laboratory experiments. Outside the laboratory, inequity often may not coincide with inequality. Motives depending on non-egalitarian reference outcomes also trigger strongly reciprocal behaviours but the domain in which helping and punishing behaviours occur depends on the reference outcome.
Box 1: Inequity Aversion and Cooperation
The goal of an inequity averse individual i can be formalized as follows. Let x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) denote the economic payoffs of all n players while r ij denotes a reference point of player i relative to player j. Then the objective function of an inequity averse player i is given by U i = x i -Σ j =i v i (x i -r ij -x j ). v i measures player i's disutility from inequity as a convex function of x i -r ijx j . v i equals zero if equity, which is defined as x i -r ij = x j , prevails. For r ij = 0 inequity aversion is tantamount to inequality aversion. Positive and negative deviations from equity cause disutility so that v i is positive for x i -r ij = x j . If x i -r ij > x j, v i is decreasing in x i and increasing in x j . If x i -r ij < x j, v i is increasing in x i and decreasing in x j . Linear, parametric, versions of inequity aversion with r ij = 0 have been proposed to enhance mathematical tractability. A version (Fehr/Schmidt 1999) which explains a wide variety of facts is
with the additional assumptions of with β i ≤α i and β i ≤1. Here α i measures the disutility from disadvantageous inequality (x j -x i > 0) while β i measures the disutility from advantageous inequality (x i -x j > 0). This parametric version of inequity aversion implies that a small minority of selfish players (with α i = β i = 0) can induce a large majority of inequity averse players to contribute nothing to a public good if targeted punishment is not available. Consider a public good situation in which each player has a resource endowment y which can be used for private purposes or spent on a public good G. Denote the contribution of i to the public good by c i and assume that G is given by the sum of all contributions Σc i . Let the economic payoff of subject i be given by x i = y -c i + bΣc i where b, which obeys 1/n < b < 1, measures the pecuniary benefit of the public good. Then, the theorem says that if b + β i < 1 player i never contributes anything to G. Moreover, if there are n o players in the group who obey b + β i < 1 and if n o > b(n-1)/2 the unique equilibrium is given by c i = 0 for all group members. Suppose, for instance, that n = 100 and b = 0.1. Then, if all members contribute nothing, each one earns y whereas if all members contribute everything each members earns bny = (0.1)100y = 10y. Despite the ten-fold income gains from full contributions, a minority of 5 selfish players suffices in attaining the unique equilibrium of zero contributions by everybody because the critical threshold b(n-1)/2 is given by (0.1)99/2 = 4.45. Thus, even if 95 players are very inequity averse, the unique equilibrium is given by zero contributions.
The situation fundamentally changes if direct punishment is possible. Suppose that player i can reduce the income of j by imposing punishment p ij on j and that i has to pay kp ij (k > 0) for this. Then it can be shown (Fehr/Schmidt 1999) that full contributions by everybody is an equilibrium if there is a subgroup of n' "conditionally cooperative punishers" and if the cost k for the punishers are not too large. The conditionally cooperative punishers are conditional cooperators (i.e. their preferences obey b + β i > 1) who punish the defectors. The cost k have to obey the condition k < α i /[(n-1)(1+α i ) -(n'-1)(α i +β i )] for all n' conditionally cooperative punishers.
A subject who feels sufficient guilt in case of unilateral defection in the PD (high β-value) does not like to defect if the other player cooperates. Inequality averse subjects are, therefore, conditional cooperators -they cooperate as long as they believe that the opponent also cooperates. Hence, if two inequality averse players are matched, mutual cooperation is an equilibrium in the PD (Figure 4c) . Moreover, if a responder in the UG dislikes earning less than the proposer, the responder prefers to reject low offers. Likewise, an inequity averse third party in the TPG punishes a greedy player A who gives nothing to the poor player B. Since inequality averse subjects value both their own payoff and equality, this approach can also explain why subjects in the PD are more likely to cooperate if the probability of repeated interactions increases. Likewise, the theory can explain why responders in the UG reject more often if they can gain an individual reputation. The reason is simply that without reputation, only the equity motive triggers rejections whereas if reputation formation is possible, both the equity motive and self-interest triggers rejections. Yet, how can inequality aversion explain that subjects reject much less under responder competition? The key factor here is that once responder A believes that the competing responder B accepts a low offer, responder A can no longer hurt the proposer by rejecting the offer. This is so because if B accepts, the proposer's proposal will be implemented. Therefore, even for an inequality averse responder with a very high envy parameter α it does not make sense to reject a low offer if he believes that the competing responder accepts. Inequality aversion also explains why those who cooperate in public good games punish the defectors: Through punishment, the cooperators can remove the difference in economic payoffs between themselves and the defectors. To explain the breakdown of cooperation in the n-player public goods game without punishment opportunities, the heterogeneity in players' preferences is crucial: The selfish players will always defect in the absence of punishment and, therefore, inequality averse players, who condition their cooperation on the other players cooperation will also defect.
These two interpretations provide the intuition for two formal theories of reciprocal fairness (Box 2). One theory is based on the view that strong reciprocators' goals are to reward fair and to punish unfair individuals (Levine 1998) . The other theory (Dufwenberg/Kirchsteiger 2004; Rabin 1993 ) rests on the motivational assumption that strong reciprocators want to reward fair and to punish unfair intentions and that intentions can be assessed by evaluating the actual choice in the light of possible alternatives. The difference is that intentions depend on the specific situation-a fair person may sometimes also exhibit unfair intentions-whereas in the first approach, fairness is viewed as a personality characteristic.
Box 2: Reciprocal Fairness and Cooperation
All models of reciprocal fairness have the feature that the economic payoff of other players is weighted positively if they are considered to be kind and negatively if they are considered unkind. Formally, the different models can be represented by the utility function Personality based reciprocal fairness (Levine 1998) . Assume that players differ in how altruistic they are. Their degree of altruism can be captured by the parameter α i . Personality based theories assume that people predict other individuals' altruism parameter. They respond by altruistic rewarding or altruistic punishment depending on their prediction of others' altruism parameters. More formally, the utility payoff of such players is given by
where α i ∈ (−1, 1) captures player i's altruistic motivation and the reciprocity parameter λ i ∈ [0, 1] measures player i's preference for reciprocation. Here kindness κ j i is defined by player j's altruism parameter α j . The valuation function v i is given
. This model has two key properties: First, the higher α i , the more player i values the other players' payoff. If α i < 0, player i is even spiteful, i.e., he prefers to reduce the other player's economic payoff. Second, the higher the altruism parameter of the other player j, the more a reciprocal player i (with λ i > 0), values player j's economic payoff. In a public goods game, players with a sufficiently high α i will cooperate. Furthermore, everything else equal (reciprocity parameter λ i and belief about the other players), players with the α i cooperate at a higher level. Therefore, players who have contributed little or nothing will be identified as less altruistic. Sufficiently reciprocal players weigh the payoff of these players negatively and, if punishment is possible, they punish the defectors.
Menu based reciprocal fairness (Rabin 1993) . In menu based models, j's kindness is determined by the actual choice of j in comparison to the alternatives (the available menus). Let A 
otherwise. This expression is always between -1 and +1. The evaluation function in this model is simply the multiplication of κ j i with an individual reciprocity parameter ρ i ≥ 0, which measures the weight of the reciprocity motive. Therefore, in the two-player case, the utility of player i is defined as U i = x i +ρ i κ j i x j which is determined by the actions and the beliefs of the players. A reciprocity equilibrium is then defined as a combination of actions and beliefs in which first, all players choose a strategy to maximize their utility and second, beliefs match the actual behaviour.
In a PD, cooperation has a kindness value of +1 and defection a value of -1 (independent of the beliefs). Therefore, if the opponent cooperates and if ρ i is sufficiently large, player i also cooperates so that there is an equilibrium with mutual cooperation. In contrast, if the opponent defects, his kindness equals -1 and therefore a reciprocal player also defects. If there is a punishment stage, sufficiently reciprocal players punish defectors because defectors' kindness is negative so that their payoff is weighted negatively.
Outcome based reciprocal fairness (Fehr/Schmidt 1999) . Outcome oriented models mimic reciprocal fairness by inequity aversion. Kindness corresponds to κ j i = x i − x j and the evaluation function is given by
Based on this definition, outcome based reciprocal fairness can be transformed into inequity aversion by assuming a utility function
Note, however, that kindness now does not weight the other player's payoff but weights inequity. This is the reason why inequity aversion predicts no punishment if the cost of punishment is identical for the punisher and the punished individual.
Both the intention-based and the personality-based approaches are based on powerful intuitions, which can rationalize why people reject low offers in the UG and why they are conditionally cooperative in the PD. It also seems possible that the reciprocal fairness approach is capable of explaining why rejections are much less frequent in the UG with responder competition, why responders reject more often if they can gain an individual reputation for being tough, and why cooperation in the PD increases if the probability of repeated encounters is higher. However, formally modelling intention-based fairness is a tricky business, and up to now no model which is mathematically easily tractable exists which would permit precise and empirically correct predictions across many different experiments. In addition, there is evidence that it is not the unfairness of the intentions alone which drives altruistic rewarding and altruistic punishment (Blount 1995; Falk et al. 2003) . If, e.g. the proposer in the constrained ultimatum game is forced to choose the alternative (8.2), because no other alternative is available, still 18 percent of the responders reject the (8.2) outcome. The lim-its of both the intention-based reciprocity approach and the inequity aversion approach have motivated models combining the two concepts (Falk/Fischbacher, in press). The combined approach can explain what can be clarified by inequity aversion and by intention-based reciprocal fairness and it overcomes the abovementioned limits of both approaches.
The personality-based approach towards reciprocal fairness (Levine, 1998 ) has proven to be more amenable to tractable formalization (Box 2). This approach also provides a natural explanation for the existence of third party punishment and third party rewarding: third parties punish those who are greedy and they reward those who have helped others in the past. In contrast, the currently available intention-based approaches (Dufwenberg/Kirchsteiger 2004; Rabin 1993 ) have difficulties in explaining third party rewarding and punishment because they are built on the reciprocal fairness motives between two interacting parties. Yet, by definition, third parties did not have previous interactions with the rewarded or punished persons.
Evolutionary Origins
What are the ultimate origins behind the rich patterns of human altruism described above? And, equally important, to what extent are the different evolutionary forces behind human altruism capable of explaining cooperation in relatively large groups? Before we go into the details, it is important to stress a basic truth: any model which successfully explains the evolution of altruistic behaviours must deliver a mechanism that ensures that the benefits of altruistic acts fall predominantly on other altruists. If such a mechanism is absent, altruism cannot evolve.
Reciprocal Altruism
Reciprocal altruism in the form of tit-for-tat or similar cooperation-sustaining strategies in the repeated PD provides such a mechanism. Here cooperation can evolve because only the two players involved in the PD benefit from mutual cooperation. The experimental evidence also unambiguously shows that in two person interactions, subjects cooperate more if future interactions are more likely (Andreoni /Miller 1993; DalBo, 2003; Gächter/Falk 2002) . Although the evolutionary paradigm of reciprocal altruism rests on powerful intuitions and explains cooperation in small kin-based groups rather well, the paradigm still suffers from several limitations: first, the interacting individuals are typically forced to stay together for a random number of periods (Hammerstein 2003) . This assumption is not only violated by many, if not most, animal interactions but it is also clearly violated in the case of genetically unrelated humans. Throughout evolutionary history, humans have almost always had the option of breaking off interactions with unrelated individuals. This does not mean that there may have been considerable obstacles in leaving a relationship; yet, unless the available outside options and individuals' decisions to stay in or to leave a relationship are modelled explicitly, it is impossible to study their impact on the evolution of altruistic behaviour. Second, with a few exceptions (Bendor/Swistak 2001; Boyd/Richerson 1988; ) the evolutionary analysis of repeated encounters has been largely restricted to two-person interactions. While this may perhaps be justified for non-human animals, the human case clearly demands the analysis of larger groups. Unfortunately, the evolutionary success of tit-for-tat like strategies of conditional cooperation is extremely limited even in relatively small groups exceeding two persons. It turns out that in n-person PDs the only conditionally cooperative, evolutionarily stable strategy prescribes cooperation only if all other group members cooperated in the previous period. Moreover, the basis of attraction of this strategy is extremely small, rendering the achievement of cooperation in larger groups very unlikely (Boyd/Richerson 1988) . We simulated the evolution of cooperation in multi-person PDs when group members repeatedly interact with each other over many periods ( Figure 6 ). It turns out that substantial rates of cooperation can only be maintained in two-person groups and, regardless of the initial conditions, cooperation quickly drops to zero in groups with more than two members. The reason for this result is that a few selfish players in a group suffice to undermine the cooperation of the conditional cooperators. Thus, repeated interactions plus the existence of strategies which condition cooperative behaviour on past outcomes (i.e., reciprocal altruism) are unlikely to be an evolutionary explanation for human cooperation in larger groups.
Third, reciprocal altruism cannot provide adaptive explanations of altruistic rewarding and punishment. It is, however, quite common to argue that strong reciprocity is a maladaptive consequence of reciprocal altruism (Binmore 1998; Johnson et al. 2003) . In this view, subjects apply behavioural rules like tit-fortat, which might make sense in repeated two-person interactions, maladaptively to one-shot encounters. In the evolutionary past, so the argument goes, oneshot interactions were rare and therefore subjects' rules are not fine-tuned to the one-shot situation. This argument faces many problems. It is contradicted by evidence from many ethnographic accounts of hunter-gatherer societies, which indicate that fitness relevant interactions with strangers have been relatively frequent (Fehr/Henrich 2003) . The argument is also contradicted by the experimental facts: subjects cooperate significantly more if they know that they will interact with the same individual again in future periods (Andreoni /Miller 1993; DalBo 2003; Gächter/Falk 2002) . Moreover, the crucial point is not that defection is the best strategy in one-shot encounters, while cooperation always pays in repeated encounters. If the present gains from defection are large enough, the best strategy for a selfish individual is to defect even if the probability of a repeated encounter is as high as or higher than 0.9. Plausibility and the ethnographic evidence suggest that-depending on the interaction partner-humans faced many different probabilities of repeated encounters so that often situations arose in which defection was the best strategy. Indeed, the very fact that humans seem to have excellent cheater detection abilities (Cosmides/Tooby 1992) suggests that, despite many repeated interactions, cheating has been a major problem throughout human evolution. Therefore, humans' behavioural rules are likely to be fine-tuned to the variations in cheating opportunities. Finally, the Figure 6 : Cooperation under reciprocal altruism in a multi-person Prisoners' Dilemma. We conducted simulations of the evolution of cooperation in 64 groups of fixed size n with n ranging from 2 to 256. The figure shows, for each group size, the average cooperation rate in 100 independent simulations over the last 1000 of 2000 generations. Cooperation has a fitness cost of c = 0.2 for the cooperator but each of the n-1 other players in the group reaps a fitness benefit of 1/(n-1) from a cooperative act. There are full defectors and conditional cooperators (i.e., reciprocal altruists) of varying degrees x. A reciprocal altruist cooperates in period t if at least x percent of the other group members cooperated in t-1. The figure shows that under reciprocal altruism cooperation can only be maintained in two-person groups. This holds regardless of whether we start with all groups being fully cooperative or only one group being fully cooperative. Group members interact repeatedly, i.e., the probability of a further period is 0.9. Strategies are implemented with an error probability of 2 percent. When the groups (a generation) cease to exist (with probability 0.1) the fitness of each individual j is compared to a randomly chosen individual k from the overall population and the probability that strategy j is replicated is given by (f j /f j +f k ). We chose this selection mechanism to render the results in Figure 6 comparable to the results in Figures 7a and 7b . If, for selection purposes, we only compare the relative fitness of randomly chosen individuals from the same group, or if we allow for probabilistic relative fitness comparisons between in-group and out-group member, cooperators do even worse. After selection, new groups are randomly formed. maladaptation argument cannot explain why non-human primates, who live in groups with many repeated interactions, do not exhibit strongly reciprocal behaviours. If humans 'mistakenly' cooperate in encounters with a 'low' frequency of future interactions why do other primates not make the same 'mistake' ?
Reputation-Seeking
Evolutionary approaches of reputation-based cooperation represent important steps beyond reciprocal altruism (Alexander 1987; Gintis et al. 2001; Leimar/ Hammerstein 2001; Nowak/Sigmund 1998a; b; Zahavi 1995) . In the indirect reciprocity model (Alexander 1987; Leimar/Hammerstein 2001; Nowak/Sigmund 1998a; b) , third parties reward individuals with a good reputation, i.e., individuals with a good image score, if they can themselves acquire a good image score by rewarding. The idea behind this approach seems compelling: people help unrelated others with whom they have no further future interactions because by helping they increase the probability that they themselves receive help in the future. Although the general idea of reputation-based cooperation is attractive, there are some unsolved problems in the indirect reciprocity approach that point towards the need for further research. First, the approach produces long-run helping rates of roughly 40 percent if the recipient's benefit is four times the donor's cost, provided that all individuals live in isolated groups without migration. If, however, genetic mixing between the groups occurs, helping rates decline dramatically and approach zero (Leimar/Hammerstein 2001) . It would be an important step forward if the indirect reciprocity approach could be modified in such a way that significant helping rates could be maintained under reasonable assumptions about migration between groups. Second, it is still an open question how best to model the concept of a good reputation. Should an individual who does not help a person with a bad reputation lose her good reputation? Currently the image scoring approach (Nowak/Sigmund 1998a; b) gives an affirmative answer to this question while others take a negative position (Leimar/Hammerstein 2001) . In our view this question is intrinsically related to a society's prevailing norms, which are themselves the product of evolutionary forces. This raises the question whether it is possible to model the evolution of reputation formation in dyadic interactions independently of the norms that prevail in a society. In our view the notion of normatively appropriate behaviour-from which a good reputation derives-is itself subject to the forces of evolution.
Until recently, the indirect reciprocity approach has been limited to dyadic cooperation. Therefore, it could not explain cooperation in larger groups. Yet, recent experiments that connect the public good game with an indirect reciprocity game point towards a potential solution (Milinski et al. 2002b ). Individuals typically interact in many different domains, e.g., they contribute to public goods and they have dyadic interactions with others. If the reputation created by higher contributions to a public good also increases the probability of receiving help in dyadic interactions, there is an incentive to contribute to the public good. A recent paper (Panchanathan/Boyd 2004) indeed showed that this in-tuition can be made rigorous. Large-scale cooperation is possible if cooperation in the indirect reciprocity game is only given to subjects who also cooperate in the public goods game. As individuals who do not cooperate in the public goods game are not helped in the indirect reciprocity game there is an economic incentive to cooperate in the public goods game.
However, Panchanathan and Boyd (2004) also point out that there are many non-cooperative equilibria in their model. Thus, in the absence of a mechanism that ensures that the population converges to the cooperative equilibria, there is no guarantee that reputation-based cooperation evolves in larger groups. One such mechanism could be competition between groups with different social norms because groups who successfully link the helping decision in the indirect reciprocity game with individuals' behaviour in the public goods game are better able to solve their public goods problems. Group competition therefore does not serve as a mechanism for offsetting within-group selection pressures against cooperative individuals but is merely a device for the selection of cooperationenhancing social norms.
Reputation-based approaches do not provide adaptive explanations for strong reciprocity. Strong reciprocators reward and punish others even when no reputation whatsoever can be acquired. A common speculation among evolutionary psychologists is that humans have hard-wired mental modules that always induce them to behave as if their reputation is at stake. In this view, strong reciprocity is a maladaptive consequence of reputation-based evolutionary forces because, so the argument goes, in the evolutionary past interactions took place exclusively in small groups where individuals' reputations were always at stake. Apart from the fact that there is no precise model that provides a foundation for this view, the experimental evidence also contradicts the argument. From indirect reciprocity games (Engelmann/Fischbacher 2002) and our UGs with and without reputation formation, we know that subjects respond quickly to opportunities for reputation formation. They punish and reward significantly more when this allows them to gain a favourable reputation. In addition, the ethnographic evidence from hunter-gatherer societies negates the idea that humans always behave as if their reputation were at stake (Fehr/Henrich 2003) . It is obvious that in a coincidental interaction with a stranger, an individual's reputation is much less at stake than in an interaction with kin or close friends. Since the ethnographic evidence indicates that humans found themselves in situations with different reputation formation possibilities, it is reasonable to assume that their behavioural rules are fine-tuned to these differences. Therefore, altruistic rewarding and punishment is unlikely to be a maladaptive consequence of reputation-based evolutionary forces.
Costly signalling theory also provides a reputation-based ultimate explanation for altruistic behaviour (Gintis et al. 2001; Zahavi 1995) . According to this approach, individuals signal favourable, yet unobservable, traits by altruistic acts, which render them preferred mating partners. The assumption behind this theory is that individuals with better traits have smaller signalling costs, i.e., smaller costs of altruistic acts. Thus, those with better traits are more likely to signal, which allows the inference that those who signal have better traits on average. The advantage of this approach is that it could, in principle, explain contributions to n-person public goods. The main weakness is that the signalling of unobservable traits need not occur by altruistic acts but can also take other forms. The approach, therefore, generates multiple equilibria-in some equilibria, signalling occurs via altruistic behaviour, in others signalling does not involve any altruistic acts. Therefore, this theory has difficulties explaining human altruism unless it is supplemented with some other mechanisms. One such mechanism might be cultural group selection (Gintis et al. 2001) . If groups in which signalling takes place via altruistic behaviour have better survival prospects, selection between groups favours those groups which have settled at a pro-social within-group equilibrium. In this context it is quite important to note that the traditional arguments against group selection do not apply because altruistic signalling is a within-group equilibrium so that there is no within-group selection against the altruistic signallers. However, so far there is neither experimental evidence suggesting that signalling takes pro-social forms nor a dynamic analysis showing that altruistic signallers can evolve when rare. In addition, costly signalling does not provide an adaptive account of strong reciprocity.
Altruists With Green Beards
A potential evolutionary explanation for strong reciprocity is to assume that individuals who reward and punish altruistically have observable characteristics ('green beards') that distinguish them from non-altruists (Frank 1988; Robson 1990; see Fehr/Fischbacher, and Frank in this issue) . It is then in the self-interest of any individual to cooperate with a green beard because non-cooperation will be punished. Thus, altruistic punishment evolves because the punishers directly benefit from their observable willingness to punish. Even in the absence of punishment opportunities, green beards favour the evolution of cooperation because individuals can condition their cooperation to the existence of a green beard. If an altruist meets a selfish individual without a green beard he defects, if he meets a green beard he cooperates. In this way, the benefits of altruistic behaviour are only reaped by the altruists themselves so that universal cooperation evolves. The green beard argument can be made more realistic by assuming that it takes some effort or that there is only a positive probability of detecting a strong reciprocator (Frank 1988 ). Yet, the crucial assumption behind this approach is that there are no selfish mutants with green beards. As soon as one allows for such mutants, the argument breaks down because the mutants reap the same benefits as the altruists but do not bear the cost of altruistic acts. Therefore, any convincing model justifying the green beard argument must allow for such mutants.
In PDs, experimental subjects are in fact capable of predicting other individuals' cooperation rate better than chance if they are given the opportunity to communicate face-to-face and to make promises before the PD is played (Frank et al. 1993) . This has been taken as evidence in favour of the hypothesis that humans are able to distinguish true cooperators from those who only pretend to cooperate. There are, however, two objections which question this argument. First, there is extensive literature showing that researchers are able to detect other people's lies with high probability using scientific methods, but that most humans are unable to detect lies better than chance (Ekman/O'Sullivan 1991; Frank/Ekman 1997) . The inability of humans to detect lies holds for a wide variety of situations, including those where stakes are high. In the most convincing experiment (Ekman/O'Sullivan 1991) the researchers showed the participants videos from lying and non-lying subjects. They ensured that it was objectively possible, by applying scientific tools, to predict the liars with high probability by watching the videos. The data indicates that 70 percent of the subjects-including subjects who can be expected to be experts, such as federal polygraphers, robbery investigators, judges and psychiatrists, are unable to detect lies significantly better than chance.
Second, the existence of subjects with a preference for conditional cooperation renders predictable behaviour in the one-shot PD if the players have the opportunity to signal their behavioural intentions in a communication stage. This is shown in more detail in the other paper by Fehr and Fischbacher in this issue. Moreover, in the associated paper we also show that a higher share of players with preferences for conditional cooperation increases the predictability of the players' behaviour. Intuitively, the reason for predictability is that individuals with, say, inequity averse or reciprocally fair preferences not only prefer mutual cooperation over unilateral defection, but they may also prefer mutual defection over the DC-outcome (Figure 4c ). Therefore, if there is a chance that the opponent will defect, they also prefer to defect. Yet, since there is also a chance that the opponent might cooperate, they want to avoid the DC-outcome by signalling that they defect. Since it is never in the interest of a subject to signal defection when he does not really want to defect, the defection signal is credible, thus rendering subjects' behaviour predictable. It is important to stress that predictability of behaviour does not mean that the players' preferences are predictable. Neither does predictability of behaviour imply that the strong reciprocators reap higher economic payoffs than the egoists who counterfactually signal cooperation. In fact, the lying egoists earn the most implying that predictability of behaviour in one-shot PD experiments with communication cannot be taken as evidence for the green beard approach towards the evolution of human cooperation.
Gene-Culture Co-Evolution
The birth of modern socio-biology is associated with scepticism toward genetic group selection of altruistic traits (Williams 1966) ; although possible in theory it has been deemed unlikely to occur empirically. The key argument is that group selection can at best be relevant in small isolated groups because migration in combination with within-group selection against altruists is a much stronger force than selection between groups. The migration of defectors to groups with a comparatively large number of altruists plus defectors' within-group fitness advantage quickly removes the genetic differences between groups so that group selection has little effect on the overall selection of altruistic traits (Aoki 1982; Rogers 1990 ). Consistent with this argument, genetic differences between groups in populations of mobile vertebrates like humans is roughly what one would expect if groups were randomly mixed (Long 1986 ). Thus, purely genetic group selection is, like the gene-based approaches of reciprocal altruism and indirect reciprocity, unlikely to provide a satisfactory explanation of strong reciprocity and of large-scale cooperation among humans.
However, the same arguments, which seem plausible when applied to pure genetic group selection, may not be relevant to the selection of culturally transmitted traits or to models of gene-culture co-evolution. Cultural transmission occurs through imitation and teaching, i.e., through social learning. There are apparently large differences in the cultural practices of different groups around the world and ethnographic evidence indicates that even neighbouring groups are often characterized by very different cultures and institutions (Kelly 1985) . Although the existence of culture is perhaps not unique to humans, the degree to which human behaviour is affected by culture is probably unique. In particular, culturally determined behavioural norms and social institutions that are sustained by punishment seem to be uniquely human. Norms and institutions like, e.g., food-sharing norms or monogamy, are important because they weaken the within-group selection against altruistic traits (Bowles et al. 2003) . Thus, if one could show that altruistic punishment and rewarding among genetically unrelated individuals can evolve through the evolution of social norms and institutions, one could explain why strong reciprocity seems to be limited to humans.
Recent theoretical models of cultural group selection (Boyd et al. 2003 ; Henrich/Boyd 2001) or of gene-culture co-evolution (Bowles et al. 2003; Gintis 2003) could provide a solution to the puzzle of strong reciprocity. The interaction between cultural group selection and altruistic punishment (Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich/Boyd 2001) , for example, could solve two problems at once: The evolution of altruistic punishment and the evolution of cooperation in relatively large groups (Figure 7a and 7b) . For the same reasons that speak against purely genetic group selection, cultural group selection alone is not capable of generating cooperation in large groups (Figure 7a ). Yet, when the altruistic punishment of non-cooperators and non-punishers is possible, punishment evolves and cooperation in much larger groups can be maintained. This is for three reasons: first, altruistic punishment of non-cooperators in combination with the imitation of economically successful behaviours prevents the erosion of group differences with regard to the relative frequency of cooperating members. If there are a sufficient number of altruistic punishers, the cooperators do better than the defectors since the latter are punished. Therefore, cooperative behaviour is more likely to be imitated. This fitness disadvantage of defectors also implies that the migration of defectors has much less effect on the evolution of cooperation than in genetic models. Second, the altruistic punishment of non-punishers implies that those who punish non-cooperators do better than pure cooperators who never punish, thus favouring the replication of strategies that punish defectors. Third, when cooperation in a group is wide-spread, altruistic punishers have only a small or no within-group disadvantage relative to pure cooperators who do not punish.
In the limit, when everybody cooperates, punishers incur no punishment costs at all and thus have no disadvantage. When no defectors are present, only mutants or errors cause the necessity to punish. Thus, small cultural group selection effects suffice to overcome the small cost disadvantage of altruistic punishers. Moreover, the cost disadvantage of altruistic punishment declines geometrically for higher order punishment (Henrich/Boyd 2001) . Taken together, these forces imply that strategies punishing defectors and non-punishers are maintained at high frequency (Figure 7b ).
To what extent is there evidence for the role of culture and group conflict in human altruism? There is strong evidence from intergenerational UGs and trust games that advice by others affects altruistic punishment and altruistic rewarding (Schotter 2003) . In these experiments, successive pairs of players play a trust or an ultimatum game. Subjects who have already played the game can give written advice to the player in the next pair who is in the same role. Advice givers have a direct interest in the behaviour of their successor because they receive half the money earned by the successors. The experiments show that advice is followed and increases altruistic punishment and altruistic rewarding relative to a control condition with no advice. Recent intergenerational public good games with advice giving indicate that later generations achieve significantly higher cooperation levels even in the absence of punishment opportunities (Chaudhuri/Graziano 2003) . UGs and dictator games with children of different ages show that older children are more generous and more willing to punish altruistically (Harbaugh et al. 2000) . Although these changes in children's behaviour could be a result of genetic developmental processes, it seems at least as plausible to assume that they are a product of socialisation by parents and peers. Why, after all, do parents invest so much time and energy into the proper socialisation of their children? Perhaps the strongest evidence for the role of cultural norms comes from a series of experiments in 15 small-scale societies (Henrich et al. 2001 ). There are decisive differences across societies in the behaviour of proposers and responders in the UG. Some tribes like the Hazda from Tanzania exhibit a considerable amount of altruistic punishment whereas the Machiguenga from Peru show little concerns about fair sharing. Thus, taken together, there is fairly convincing evidence that cultural forces exert a significant impact on human altruism.
Yet, what is the evidence for cultural group selection? There is quite strong evidence that group conflict and warfare were wide-spread in foraging societies (Jorgensen 1980; Otterbein 1985) . There are also examples (Kelly 1985; Soltis et al. 1995) suggesting that group conflict contributes to the cultural extinction of groups because the winning groups force their cultural norms and institutions on the losing groups. However, although these examples are suggestive, they are not conclusive so that further evidence has high value.
If cultural group selection was a significant force in evolution, then the human propensity to reward and punish altruistically should be systematically affected by inter-group conflicts. In particular, people should be more willing to punish defectors if defection occurs in the context of a group conflict. Likewise altruistic cooperation should be more prevalent if cooperative acts contribute to success Figure 7 : Cooperation under altruistic punishment and group conflicts in a multi-person Prisoners' Dilemma. As in Figure 6 we simulate the evolution of cooperation in 64 groups of fixed size n with n ranging from 2 to 256. Cooperation has a fitness cost of c = 0.2 for the cooperator but each of the n-1 other players in the group reaps a fitness benefit of 1/(n-1) from a cooperative act.
(a) Figure 7a shows, for each group size, the average cooperation rate in 100 independent simulations over the last 1000 of 2000 generations. An individual who punishes incurs cost of k = 0.2 and the total cost for all punished individuals is p = 0.4. Figure 7a indicates that in the absence of altruistic punishment, no cooperation can be maintained for groups of size 16 or larger. If the altruistic punishment of non-cooperators is possible, substantial cooperation rates can be maintained up to groups of size 32. If, in addition, the altruistic punishment of non-punishers is possible, very high cooperation rates can be maintained for groups up to 256 members. The model underlying Figure 7a differs from the model underlying Figure 6 as follows: first, there are no repeated interactions, ruling out any form of reciprocal altruism. Second the model allows for the following strategies: defectors, pure cooperators who never punish, cooperators who punish non-cooperators (i.e., 1 st level punishers), cooperators who punish non-cooperators and non-punishers (i.e., 2 nd level punishers). Third, all graphs are based on the assumption that, initially, there is only one group of 1 st level or 2 nd level punishers. Fourth, after each period player j imitates the strategy of player k with probability (f k /f j +f k ). k is a member of the own group with probability 0.8 and a member of another randomly chosen group with probability 0.2. Fifth, after individual within-group selection took place, groups are randomly matched and a conflict occurs with probability 0.05. In case of a conflict, group j replaces group k with probability 1 2 + 1 2 (C j -C k ) where C j is the frequency of cooperators in group j. Group replacement mimics the fact that the loosing group takes over the cultural traits and institutions of the winning group.
(b) Figure 7b shows the evolution of strategies in a typical simulation when altruistic punishment of non-cooperators and non-punishers is possible (n = 256). Initial conditions ensure that in 63 groups only defectors exist whereas in one group there are only altruistic 2 nd level punishers. Already after roughly 200 periods the share of defectors is below 10 percent. The share of pure cooperators varies between 5 and 10 percent whereas the share of 1 st level punishers stabilizes after 1000 periods at roughly 50 to 60 percent. After period 1000, the share of the 2 nd level punishers varies between 20 and 30 percent.
in a group conflict. There is evidence from inter-group conflict games indicating that altruistic cooperation in PDs indeed increases if the PD is embedded in an inter-group conflict (Bornstein/Ben-Yossef 1994) . However, in the absence of punishment opportunities the existence of inter-group conflicts does not prevent the decay of cooperation over time (Bornstein et al. 1994) and so far there is no evidence showing that inter-group conflicts increase altruistic punishment. There is also no evidence for the punishment of non-punishers in public good games. In view of the predicted strong impact of this kind of punishment on large-scale cooperation (Figure 7a,b) , such evidence would have high value.
Open Problems
We know now a lot more about human altruism than we did one decade ago. There is experimental evidence indicating that repeated interactions, reputationformation, and strong reciprocity are powerful determinants of human behaviour. There are formal models which capture the subtleties of interactions between selfish and strongly reciprocal individuals and there is a much better understanding about the nature of the evolutionary forces that probably shaped human altruism. However, there are still a considerable number of open problems. In view of the relevance of cultural evolution, it is necessary to study the relationship between cultural and economic institutions and the prevailing patterns of human altruism. Although recent evidence (Henrich et al. 2001) suggests that market integration and the potential gains from cooperation are important factors, our knowledge is still extremely limited. This limitation is partly due to the fact that far too many experiments use students from advanced countries as participants. Instead, we need experiments with participants that are representative of whole countries or cultures and we need to combine behavioural measures of altruism with individual-level demographic data and group-level data about cultural and economic institutions. In view of the theoretical importance of group conflicts and group reputation, much more evidence on how these affect altruistic rewarding and punishment is necessary. We also need more empirical knowledge about the characteristics of the individual reputation acquired by people and how others respond to this reputation. At the ultimate level, the evolution and role of altruistic rewarding for cooperation in larger groups remain in the dark. Likewise, the empirical study of altruistic rewarding has been largely limited to dyadic interactions and little is known about how cooperation in n-person public good situations is affected if subjects, after they observed each others' actions in the PD, have the opportunity to altruistically reward others. Evolutionary explanations of altruistic rewarding are likely to be much more difficult than explanations of altruistic punishment because, when cooperation is frequent, rewarding causes high costs for the altruists whereas a credible punishment threat renders actual punishment unnecessary. At the level of proximate theories of human motivation, we still lack parsimonious and tractable formal models of reciprocal fairness, which make precise, testable, predictions. Finally, to enhance
